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This paper suggests that pension characteristics are simultaneously determined along with 
workers’ retirement ages. Both the age of pension eligibility and actual retirement age are 
determined by the productivity and marginal disutility of work, factors that are influenced by 
worker and job characteristics. This approach differs from previous studies of retirement that 
treat pensions as exogenous, implying that prior empirical work may have overestimated the 
responsiveness of retirement age to changes in pension structure, a possibility with obvious 
policy implications for efforts to raise the age of retirement. We find that, in the conventional 
single-equation framework, delaying the age of pension eligibility would significantly delay 
retirement. When treated in a recursive simultaneous system, however, age of pension 
eligibility retains no explanatory power. 
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1For evidence on the effect of Social Security, see Quinn (1977), Boskin and Hurd (1978),
Burkhauser (1979), Hanoch and Honig (1983), Burtless and Moffitt (1984), Hurd and Boskin (1984),
Hausman and Wise (1985), Gustman and Steinmeier (1985), Honig and Reimers (1989), and Reimers and
Honig (1996).  For findings on the importance of employer pensions, see Burkhauser and Quinn (1983),
Fields and Mitchell (1984), Kotlikoff and Wise (1987), Gustman and Steinmeier (1989), Stock and Wise
(1990a, 1990b), Ippolito (1990), Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992), Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier
(1994), Thio and Woittiez (1996), and Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2002) .  Other contributions to this
literature are summarized in Honig and Hanoch (1981), Fields and Mitchell (1982), Lazear (1986), and
Quinn, Burkhauser and Myers (1990). 
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1. Introduction
The link between pensions and retirement behavior is of considerable interest to economists and,
increasingly, to policymakers.  The decline in the age of retirement in postwar years has generally been
attributed in increased pension benefits, both private and through the Social Security system.
1  A clear
implication of these findings is that the anticipated difficulties in financing currently projected Social
Security benefits could be mitigated by changes in the age of pension eligibility that could be expected to
delay retirement.
This conclusion has been drawn from empirical work that has treated pensions as exogenous
determinants of the retirement decision.  With pension characteristics assumed to be exogenous, various
researchers have reported substantial effects of changing the age of eligibility on retirement behavior. 
Woodland (1987) finds that eligibility for private pensions more than doubled the probability that a 64
year old worker with modal characteristics in his sample had retired.  Stock and Wise (1990b) claim that
shifting the age of first eligibility for pension (early retirement age) from 55 to 60 reduced the probability
of retirement before age 60 by over a third, while Blau (1994) finds that the hazard of leaving the labor
force at the age of eligibility was between 50 and 100% higher than at surrounding ages.
We believe that the interpretations placed on these observed correlations may have been
influenced by a fundamental misunderstanding of the link between pensions and retirement.  In this paper,
we test an alternative model that views pensions and retirement age as simultaneous outcomes of an      
2Some researchers have been aware of this possibility but have ignored it in empirical work (See,
for example, Fields and Mitchell,1984, and Ippolito,1990).  To our knowledge, only the study by Thio and
Woittiez (1996) has treated the age of eligibility for employer pension benefits as an endogenous variable.
3This interpretation is consistent with results in Chan and Stevens (2004), which show that within-
person variation in retirement incentives have less than half the impact on retirement age that would be
predicted from cross-section analyses.  See also Coile and Gruber (2000), who raise a concerns about the
“lack of careful attention to the sources of identification of retirement incentives (p. 9), especially with respect
to the correlation of wages and pension wealth with  individuals’ underlying tastes for retirement.  In our
framework these tastes for retirement will arise from differences in occupational characteristics as well as
personal preferences.
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underlying comparison of workers' productivity and their disutility from work. By misstating the
relationship between pensions and retirement, previous studies may have substantially overstated the
potential for using changes in pensions to alter retirement behavior.
2  This potential bias is of more than
theoretical interest since interpreting the observed correlation between pensions and retirement age as
causally driven would induce firms to underestimate the change in pension wealth required to create a
desired change in retirement age.
A weaker than expected response of retirement age to pensions could also have implications for
public policy.  The 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act included incentives to delay retirement
beyond age 65.  The age of eligibility for full benefits was to gradually be increased from 65 to 67 during
the years 2003 to 2027, effectively reducing benefits of those retiring before age 67.  Further delays are
currently under consideration.   Projections of the impact of these delays in the age of eligibility on actual
retirement age play a key role in the anticipated role that changes in Social Security provisions will play
in the financial soundness of the system.  To the extent that retirement age is embedded in a long-term
optimizing decision, however, it may prove to be less responsive to changes in either private or public
pensions than cross section research suggests.
3  As a consequence, neither expected increases in payroll
tax revenue nor expected reductions in outlays for Social Security benefits will be fully realized.  In this
case, the Social Security trust funds may come under renewed pressure as workers adapt private savings
to maintain the optimal age of retirement.  Other countries face similar problems in redesigning pension4See Siddiqui (1997) for an example of such a policy analysis that devotes a great deal of attention
to specifying pension benefits properly for any given worker but still assumes that the terms under which
these benefits are set are exogenous to that worker.
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systems in the face of fiscal pressures and may be in danger of basing policy on similarly problematic
results from estimates assuming that pensions are exogenous.
4
It should be noted that nothing in our analysis is inconsistent with empirical findings that sudden,
unanticipated discontinuous changes in pension terms such as early retirement bonus windows induce
large responses (see Mutschler (1986) and Brown (1996)).  Obviously, the ability of individuals to adust
private savings to offset changes in pension plans will increase the longer they have to adapt.  If an
individual who has optimally planned on retiring at a given age and saved accordingly is presented with a
large increase in wealth conditional on retiring at a slightly earlier age, it is to be expected that this wealth
effect may induce a retirement response.  Thus, a change in age of eligibility that occurs near the optimal
age (when the bulk of savings have taken place) will have a very different result than one that occurs
early in a worker’s life when there is sufficient time for savings to adapt.  This implies that responses to
policy changes should be expected to decay over time.
In this paper, we test the endogeneity of pensions in the retirement process.  We estimate a model
that treats pensions and retirement age as joint outcomes resulting from workers and firms comparing
productivities and reservation wages (disutility from working an additional period) at various ages. 
Estimates are derived from a data set that contains job characteristics accumulated from a number of
sources merged with longitudinal micro-data from the Retirement History Survey (RHS) of the Social
Security Administration.  Findings generally support the contentions that the age of pension eligibility is
endogenously determined along with the age of retirement, and that the failure to recognize this
relationship may impart a substantial upward bias into estimates of the effect of pension eligibility on the
decision to retire.5Not all workers need to plan for retirement.  It is easy to envision occupational-worker matches
where productivity never falls below the disutility from work, so that workers might expect to continue to
work (perhaps with reduced hours) until death.
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2.  Employer Pensions and the Retirement Decision 
Private pensions are an important source of retirement income and comprise a large share of
individual wealth in many developed economies.  In 2003, pension fund assets amounted to 69% of GDP
in the U.S.  Comparable figures in other economies were even higher (ranging up to 101% of GDP in
Switzerland and 106% of GDP in the Netherlands).  In order to understand how such pensions might affect
retirement behavior, we begin by considering a world in which pensions do not exist. As a worker ages
both his or her productivity and the disutility resulting from working another period will change.  In a true
spot labor market, where wages are always equal to the value of marginal product, retirement will be
optimal whenever the additional income (productivity) from working the next period falls below the
disutility generated by working that period.  It is reasonable to assume that the disutility from, and the
productivity of, working an additional period will change at different rates in different jobs depending on
the characteristics of those jobs.  They will also, obviously, vary across individuals according to the
characteristics of the workers.  Thus, the age at which workers retire will depend on both the
characteristics of the workers and of the jobs they hold.  In a true spot labor market, firms, which always
pay workers the value of their additional output in each period, will be indifferent to the age at which
retirement occurred.
In such a world there is no need for pensions.  Workers who anticipated retiring
5 would simply
save during their working life to finance post-retirement consumption.  The most obvious reason for
pensions is their tax advantages, with pension contributions being allowed to accumulate pre-tax until after
the worker retires.  Pensions in such a world, however, should be defined contribution plans in which a
specified portion of earnings are set aside each period as a contribution to a pension.  Such plans could
utilize tax advantages and force workers to make a binding pre-commitment to save for retirement, yet6This remains true even though defined contribution plans have become increasingly popular in recent
years, particularly with the introduction of voluntary employee-contributed 401(k) plans.  Among small firms,
401(k) plans tend to serve as the primary pension plan, Among medium and large firms, however, the
incidence of defined benefit and defined contribution plans is about equal at 50% of workers.  Data from IRS
filings indicates that, among firms with more than 100 employees, the proportion of workers whose primary
plan provided defined benefits was 80 percent in 1985 (Clark, Gohmann, and McDermed, 1988).
7Where wages are defined to include increases in pension wealth in any period.
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easily maintain the equality between wages (including pension contributions) and productivity in each
period.  A large (although decreasing) number of pension plans, however, are not defined contribution
plans but rather defined benefit plans that provide a specific benefit after retirement and adjust
contributions to ensure that the amount set aside is sufficient to finance this benefit.
6
Defined benefit plans must, therefore, exist for reasons other than tax-advantaged savings.  One
possibility is that such plans have the advantage of shifting capital market risk from workers to firms who
can, for all the usual portfolio reasons, be assumed to be the less risk-averse participant in the employment
relationship.  A more compelling rationale arises from the role of pensions in optimal contracts.  A number
of models suggest that both firms and workers benefit from a payment stream in which workers receive
less than the value of their marginal product when young and more than their marginal product when old. 
Lazear (1979) suggests that such a profile reduces workers' incentives for shirking and cheating and
thereby raises their lifetime wealth.   Other long-term contract models focus on the role of pensions in
retaining workers with firm-specific human capital (Becker, 1962) and in sorting workers according to
unobservable characteristics  (Salop and Salop, 1976). 
Even if wages
7 diverge from the value of a worker’s marginal product in each period, however,
competition in the labor market ensures that the present discounted value of wages and productivity must
be equal over the worker’s entire career:6
where r is the interest rate, VMP is the value of the worker’s marginal product, and R is the age of
retirement. 
Obviously this equality can not be set to hold with w … VMP for each period unless R is known. 
However, for these purposes any R will suffice and, once R is known, an appropriate wage profile can be
set.  The question that we must address is how R is determined.  As in the optimal separations literature
(see Mortensen, 1978; Hashimoto and Yu, 1980; and Hashimoto, 1981), it is optimal from both sides of
the market (employer and employee) for a worker to leave a firm whenever productivity in that firm falls
below outside opportunities.  The  retirement decision can simply be viewed as a special case of this world
where the alternative is the reservation wage instead of the productivity in another firm.  Thus, ex ante, at
the time of initial contracting both workers and firms will want to set R at exactly the age at which
productivity falls below the disutility from work.
Ex post, however, long-term contracts will result in the actual wage being higher than productivity
at this age.  Workers will, therefore, have an incentive to renege on the initial contract and continue
working until the disutility from work has risen enough to equal w (where it is, by definition, > VMP). 
Thus, some enforcement mechanism must ensure that workers retire when initially planned. The easiest
such enforcement mechanism is to establish a firm-specific age of mandatory retirement at an age that
reflects the distribution of optimal retirement ages among the firm’s workers.  If, however, this cannot be
done, an acceptable second best is to provide a financial incentive to retire at this age.  This can be done by
buy-out offers or by discontinuous changes in the amount of pension wealth.  Alternatively, if workers are
myopic (see Reimers and Honig, 1996), simply making benefits available only after a given age will be
perceived as a discontinuous increase in the value of retirement at that age.8See also Kotlikoff and Wise (1987).  Gustman and Steinmeier also report a much smaller spike in
the increase in pension wealth (24% of annual salary) at the age of eligibility for full benefits as well as a
decrease in pension wealth for each year worked after “normal” retirement age, since most plans did not
accrue years of service into benefit formulae after this age.  This lack of accrual is no longer legal in the U.S.,
so it is an open question whether the small spike at the stated age of normal retirement remains in existence.
We are relatively agnostic as to why firms maintained this second, smaller spike.  It may have arisen because
of integration with the Social Security system (most firms initially defined the age of normal retirement at
65, the age of eligibility for full Social Security benefits).  An economic rationale for its existence may arise
if firms want to use an unusually large wage increase to bribe workers who have been revealed to be
especially productive after the initial contract provisions are determined to continue working past the age of
anticipated retirement.  In this case, a second spike at a later age will be required to induce these workers to
leave the workforce.  It remains the case, however, that the frequent occurrence of a large increase in pension
wealth at the age of eligibility for early retirement strongly suggests that this is the age at which firms and
workers anticipated inducing retirement at the time the contract was designed.
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Thus, we would expect to find large changes in pension wealth corresponding with the age at
which workers are eligible to retire.  In most defined benefit plans, the increase in pension wealth is largest
at the age at which workers are first eligible for benefits, even though full benefits may not be paid until
the “normal” retirement age. Surveying a sample of plans covering 530 workers, Gustman and Steinmeier
(1989) found that pension wealth increased by 15 to 16 percent of annual wages in each of the several
years immediately before and after the age at which a worker was first eligible for benefits but by almost
75 percent of annual wages in the first year of eligibility.
8  
We would also expect to find that worker and job characteristics determine both the structure of
the long-term contract, including its pension provisions, and the age at which workers retire.  This
emphasis on the endogeneity of pension characteristics in response to the work environment in the
theoretical literature stands in stark contrast to the widespread assumption of exogeneity in empirical work. 
Lazear (1979) finds evidence that workers' education, for example, is positively correlated with firms' age
of mandatory retirement (and thus with pension eligibility).  
Job characteristics have also received attention.   Studies that have examined their role in
influencing retirement age include Quinn, 1978; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986; Filer and Petri, 1988;
Holden, 1988; Hayward et. al., 1989; Chirikos and Nestle, 1991; Hurd and McGarry, 1994; Thio and9One implication of this approach is that desired changes in retirement age are more likely to be
created by changes in job attributes than by changes in pension wealth or structure.  For example, jobs
imposing heavy physical demands that induce early retirement might be restructured as multiple part-time
positions or might be redesigned to increase the amount of labor-saving capital employed.  Similarly, some
of the more stressful aspects of jobs might be reduced by appropriate redesign.  Job redesign as a tool for
affecting workers’ retirement decisions has generally been ignored in the literature.  Doeringer and Terkla
(1989), however, discuss attempts by employers faced with labor shortages to retain older workers.  To the
extent that job design is negotiated at the time of hire, job characteristics, as well as age of eligibility, may
be endogenous.  Relative to the latter, however, job characteristics are likely to be technologically determined
to a greater extent and thus less open to negotiation.
8
Woittiez, 1996; Solem and Mykletun, 1997; Hayward, Friedman and Chen, 1998; Hirsch, Macpherson and
Hardy, 2000; Yeatts, Folts, and Knapp, 2000; Derriennic, Saurel-Cubizolles and Montfort, 2003; Johnson,
2004; and Blekesaune and Solem, 2005).  All except the studies by Filer and Petri and Thio and Woittiez,
however, have ignored the potential effect of job characteristics on pension characteristics.
If, as workers age, there are differential changes in productivities and in tolerances for various job
conditions, then the expected length of a worker's career and the provisions of his or her optimal contract
should differ from job to job.  When a job's characteristics point to a relatively short work-life (i.e., "early
retirement"), pension plans should provide for early receipt of benefits.  From this perspective, job
characteristics should influence both pension structure and retirement age, and the observed relationship
between pensions and retirement age in the empirical literature should be recognized as one of correlation,
not causation.
9  In the extreme the logic of this reasoning is obvious.  The fact that their pension plan
allows retirement in after less than 20 years of service is unlikely to be the reason that most professional
football players retire before the age of 40.  On the other hand, given that the demands of professional
sports mean that few athletes are able to perform at the required level as they approach middle age does
provide a strong incentive for professional sports unions to negotiate contracts that allow for retirement at
an early age.  The same reasoning goes for strenuous but less visible jobs such a police and fire services
where retirement after 20 years (typically before individuals reach age 50) is a common contract provision.
Evidence supporting the role of worker and job characteristics in influencing pensions comes from
examining the age at which workers are eligible for benefits across various plans.  Overall, the age of      
10Bankers Trust, 1980.  This survey, by one of the largest custodial banks for pension plans in the
U.S., was conducted every five years from 1960 to 1980.  Firms included in the survey employed
approximately 25% of all pension plan participants.  "Conventional" plans normally use both years of service
and last earnings in determining benefits; less common "pattern" plans use years of service only (See Ippolito,
1990, for a detailed discussion of these data).  "Full" benefits are computed by applying the normal retirement
benefit formula to the compensation and years of service up to the date of retirement without any reduction
for earlier receipt of the pension.
11There are a number of reasons why ages of eligibility may have fallen over this period.  With the
workweek having stabilized at around 40 hours, increases in leisure consumption in response to rising real
incomes appear to have come in the form of greater contiguous blocks of non-work time such as longer
vacations and earlier retirement.  Firms and workers may also have responded to changes in Social Security
over this period that made earlier retirement more attractive.  Reduced Social Security benefits at age 62 first
became available to men in 1961 (women had been eligible for reduced benefits at that age since 1956).  This
change would have caused a discontinuous shift upward in the reservation wage at age 62, similar to that
created by eligibility for full benefits at 65, and may have lowered the optimal retirement age for some
workers.  In addition, the real value of Social Security benefits increased substantially during the early 1970s.
Finally, intertemporal substitution considerations may have made it optimal for generations reaching their
sixties in the 1980s to concentrate their working hours earlier in their life and concentrate their consumption
of leisure in their older years when labor market competition from the baby boom generation put downward
pressure on real wages. 
      
12Of the remainder, 4 percent did not provide for retirement before eligibility for full benefits and
4 percent had a service requirement only (Bankers Trust, 1980, Appendix Table 17).  
      
13The remaining 5 percent did not use age as a criterion for eligibility (Bankers Trust, 1980).
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eligibility has fallen in recent years.  In 1960, none of the conventional defined benefit plans included in a
survey of 350 large firms paid full pension benefits prior to age 65.
10  By 1980, 69 percent of the plans
surveyed provided full benefits earlier than age 65.  Over the same period, the mean age at which workers
were eligible to first receive actuarially-reduced early benefits declined from 56.7 to 53.9 years.
11  The key
observation, however, is that despite the substantial reduction in the mean age of first eligibility for
pension benefits, the variance in this age across plans remained remarkably stable.  In 1960, 5 percent of
conventional defined benefit plans provided early benefits as early as age 50, 56 percent at age 55, and 31
percent at age 60.
12  The distribution of ages of eligibility for early benefits twenty years later represents to
a first approximation simply a leftward shift of this earlier distribution.  In 1980, 24 percent of plans
provided early benefits at age 50, 67 percent at 55, and 4 percent at 60.
13  Thus, while the mean age of
eligibility for benefits declined by 2.8 years during this period, the coefficient of variation of the age of      
14Bankers Trust (1980).
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first eligibility remained roughly constant at .05.  We suggest that this stability in the variance of the age of
eligibility for early benefits, during a period of substantial change in other aspects of defined benefit
pension plans, is indicative of fundamental and persistent differences across firms in the optimal retirement
age. 
A similar variability in ages of eligibility exists in other countries.  In 1991, 5% of British men
between the ages of 45 and 54 were receiving an employer-sponsored pension as opposed to 19% of those
55 to 59, 40% of those 60 to 64 and 70% of those over 65 years of age (OECD, 1997). 
We further observe that systematic differences in the age of eligibility for early benefits appear to
exist across industries, strengthening our contention that pensions are related to worker preferences and job
characteristics.  Provision for retirement at the earliest reported age of 50 was far more common in 1980 in
heavy-manufacturing industries such as chemicals (42% of plans), utilities (30%), oil (29%), and
pharmaceuticals (27%), for example, than it was in retail trade and food (0%), insurance (8%), or banking
(11%).
14  We also observe substantial variation in retirement age across occupations during the same
period.  As shown in Table 1, the mean age of those retiring from different occupations during the second
half of the 1970s ranged from the late 50s to over 70. 
These differences in defined benefit pensions and in retirement ages cannot be accounted for in
conventional models that treat pensions as exogenous to the retirement process.  They are consistent,
however, with the premise that worker and job characteristics influence both the age of pension eligibility
and the age of retirement.  A model outlining this relationship is described in the next section.
3.    The Dynamics of Retirement Behavior
The estimations presented below can be motivated by a simple model of retirement behavior and
pension plans.  The basic results are derived from three assumptions:      
15There is a good deal of evidence that workers do not in fact know their pension wealth until just
before they actually retire (see, for example, Reimers, 1977).  The above analysis suggests that this may not
be as irrational as it first appears.  Workers whose pension structure is set in response to their optimal age of
retirement need only to know that age.
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1) As workers age, both their productivities in their jobs and their reservation wages
(marginal disutilities) for working an additional period in these jobs change.  In general,
their marginal disutility from work will increase and their marginal productivity will fall
(or at least not increase as rapidly as the disutility). 
2) Both workers and firms will want to provide for retirement at the age at which the
productivity from working an additional period falls below the disutility from working
that additional period.  Because of long-term contract considerations, actual wages at this
age may be greater than productivity.  Thus, contracts will be designed and agreed to by
both parties at the time of initial employment to either require firms to fire workers at this
age (mandatory retirement) or induce workers to retire at the optimal age.
3) The optimal age of retirement can, therefore, be inferred by examining the provisions built
into pension plans.  The most common method of creating incentives that induce
retirement at the ex ante optimal age is to provide a discontinuous increase in workers’
pension wealth at this optimal age. We have presented evidence of unusually large
increases in pension wealth at particular ages.  The fact that pension wealth increases so
much at a particular age suggests that, given information costs, workers may obtain all the
information they need about the provisions of their pension plans by knowing at what age
they are eligible to retire rather than the full benefit calculation rules.  The practical import
of this assumption is that the key elements of pension plans can be summarized by the use
of age of eligibility rather than  more complicated variables such as pension wealth
accruals at each age.
15 12
If all contracts were worker-specific and everything were known with certainty at the time the
contract was written, then age of eligibility and age of retirement would always be identical and either
could be estimated as a reduced-form function of worker and job characteristics.  Given the presence of
uncertainty, a distribution of both productivities and reservation wages, and common pension plans that
cover workers with different characteristics in different occupations, observed ages of eligibility and of
retirement are linked but not identical.  In particular, two fundamental relationships exist:
Ae = f(X, Y) (1)
and
Ar = g(X, Z, Ae) (2)
where Ar is the worker's actual age of retirement and Ae is the age at which the worker is eligible for
pension benefits.   X is a vector of characteristics that determine both age of retirement and the age at
which a worker's contract provides for pension benefits.  Our model suggests that this vector is composed
of characteristics that determine both worker productivity and disutility from work, i.e., characteristics of
the job and attributes of the individual at the time of job acceptance.  The latter category might include
age, education, and expected lifetime income. Furthermore, the model suggests that if workers perfectly
predict their future preferences and opportunities, fx and gx  should have the same sign .  Y and Z represent
the vectors of variables that determine only age of pension eligibility and actual age of retirement,
respectively.
Previous work has typically estimated only Equation (2) above.  In doing so, it has explicitly
assumed Ae to be exogenously determined, as discussed above. It has also typically omitted worker
attributes and job characteristics in the X vector from the equation.  This creates two possible estimation
problems.  There is a classic case of bias due to the presence of an endogenous right-hand side variable,
with age of eligibility being correlated with the error term in the age of retirement equation.  There may
also be an omitted variable problem created by the omission of job characteristics from the age of
retirement equation since the existence of equation (1) implies that cov(Ae, X) will not be zero. This16Age of early retirement if such is available in the pension plan and age of full retirement if there
is no provision for early retirement.
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suggests that conventional estimates are likely to overstate the true effect of exogenous variations in Ae on
retirement behavior by incorporating into estimated eligibility effects the influence of variables that
determine both ages of eligibility and retirement.  We investigate each of these potential problems.  Results
will be reported first for estimates that allow the age of pension eligibility to be endogenous, ignoring the
potential effect of job characteristics.  We then report the impact of including these characteristics.  
4. Data
The model outlined above is estimated using a sample drawn from the Retirement History Study
(RHS) of white married men on career jobs in 1969 who were observed to retire from these jobs during the
11-year span of the survey.  This sample has been the basis for a number of studies of retirement and labor
market re-entry behavior (Honig and Reimers, 1987, 1989; Reimers and Honig, 1993, 1996).  The
disadvantage of using the RHS is that while it includes information on age of pension eligibility, it does
not include pension benefit formulae; thus we are unable to calculate the actual increase in pension wealth
at each age.  We have argued above, however, that the important factor for our model, the age at which
pension contracts expect workers to require, is revealed by the age at which they are eligible to retire, a
conclusion supported by the fact that workers typically know the latter but not their pension wealth.  The
advantage of using the RHS is that it contains longitudinal data for a large sample at a time when defined
benefit plans, where age of eligibility is a meaningful concept, predominated in the U.S.  Due to the lack of
variation in public pension ages of eligibility, it is typically cross-section variation in the terms of such
plans that forms the basis of projections regarding the impact of changes in public pensions.  We focus on
analysis of the two interrelated variables in these data, according to the model outlined above: the age at
which a worker is first eligible for a pension
16 and the age at which he actually retires.    
17Most remaining workers were on jobs they had recently begun, for which the concept of retirement
is less clear.  See Appendix Table A-1 for construction of the sample used in earlier studies and additional
exclusions relevant to the current study.  
   
16A total of 396 workers on full-time career jobs in 1969 were excluded in the original sample
because a transition to retirement was not observed for them.  Of these, 96 moved directly to a new employer
after leaving their career job, 53 moved to part-time status with the same employer, and 247 either left the
survey or were still working at the last interview in 1979.  We were not able to determine how many workers
among the 53 moving to part-time status were still employed by their career employer at the 1979 interview,
nor how many among the 247 career job holders were still working at the last interview, as opposed to having
left the sample due to death or simple attrition.  Our results therefore may be biased due to this right-
censoring.  (Of the 96 moving directly to another employer, only those receiving pension benefits from the
career employer would have been included in our sample of retired workers.)  We believe the magnitude of
the bias to be fairly small, however.  Among white men in the RHS survey as a whole, only 11.9  percent
were working in 1979.  Even in the extreme case that all 300 career job holders omitted in the original sample
were still working in the 1979 interview, only a small proportion were likely to have been covered by a
private pension.  In 1979, only 15 percent of white male wage earners aged 65 and over were covered by
pensions (Kotlikoff and Smith 1983, Table 3.2.5).  This proportion is likely to be an over-estimate for the
workers of concern, who would have been 68 and over in 1979.  Nonetheless, if we estimate that 15 percent,
or 45, of the 300 workers were covered by pensions, it is likely that one-fifth to one-quarter of these would
not have reported the industry and occupation of their career job (using sample proportions for workers
observed to retire before the last interview (Appendix Table A-1).  Finally, only two-thirds of those remaining
are likely to have been in the selected age range, 68-70, in 1979 (see Appendix Table A-1, and discussion
below).  Thus, we estimate that our final sample would have been larger by about 5 percent, or approximately
25 workers.
14
Among 2,541 white married male wage-earners for whom employment histories could be
constructed, 1,652 were on career jobs in 1969.  Career jobs are defined in this sample as full-time (30 or
more weekly hours of work) jobs held since before age 55, providing the worker does not describe himself
as either partially or fully retired.
17 Of these workers, 1,253 were observed to leave these jobs during the
survey, 712 of whom were covered by pensions and also reported the industry and occupation of their
job.
18 
We further limited the sample to those aged 58-60 at the start of the survey, resulting in a final
sample of 453 career job-holders in 1969.  By restricting the sample to a narrow age range of relatively
younger workers, we reduce the effects of unmeasured tastes for work on retirement age.  If we had
included workers older than age 60 (the earliest age at which significant retirement is observed in the full19For a discussion of the process by which these characteristics were chosen, see the discussion in
Filer and Honig, 2005.
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RHS sample), those with especially strong distastes for work may have already retired, resulting in a non-
zero mean of the distribution of error terms. 
Table 2 provides a cross tabulation of the distributions of the two dependent variables in our
model: the earliest age of eligibility (for reduced benefits, or for full benefits when reduced benefits are not
offered) and the age of retirement. It is clear that while ages 62 and 65 are the modal ages for earliest
receipt of benefits, 11.8% of the sample are eligible before 62, with ages 55 and 60 being most frequent.
Less than 2% of the sample are first eligible for benefits after 65.  Similarly, there are peaks in actual
retirement at ages 62 and 65, but 23.6% of the sample retire between these modal ages.  Slightly under
13% retire earlier than age 62.  Finally, careful inspection of the table indicates that age of eligibility and
age of retirement are related.
The RHS does not contain information regarding the characteristics of jobs held by panel
members.  It does, however, indicate the industry and occupation of employment at the three-digit level,
enabling the inclusion of job characteristics from other sources.   In the end, five job characteristics were
included in the analysis covering a wide range of characteristics that intuitively ought to be related to
optimal ages of retirement and pension eligibility.  They are:
(1) Whether it is a worker's own responsibility to decide how things get done on his job.
(2) How hard it would be for workers to get the duties of their job changed if they wanted to.
(3) Whether a worker is exposed to any "great or sizable" hazards in the workplace.
(4) Whether physical conditions at the workplace are not as pleasant or comfortable as
workers would like.
(5) How much effort (either physical or mental) the job requires.
19
Other right-hand-side variables in the equations estimating both the age of pension eligibility and
the realized retirement age are those in the X vector that measure attributes of the individual.   These      
20Since about 10% of respondents did not report their education, they were included with a value
of zero along with a dummy variable for education being missing.
      
21Calculated as the sum of real earnings between ages 45 and 58.  Since the earnings were taken from
Social Security records, amounts were annualized if the taxable earnings maximum was reached in the third
quarter or earlier.
22Health status is measured at the end of the worker’s career job since health status at the start of the
current job is not available in the RHS.
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include the worker's years of education,
20 whether the job was in the government sector (where pension
incentives may be different than in profit maximizing .firms), a proxy measure for the worker's expected
permanent income,
21 the worker’s health status,
22 and the age at which he started his career job. The age of
eligibility equation also includes as variables in the Y vector the macroeconomic variables at the time the
worker started his career job.  The age of retirement equations also include variables in the Z vector.  These
are attributes of the individual at the time of retirement such as whether the worker was still married (a
small proportion of the sample experienced changes in marital status after 1969), whether he resided in a
warm region, and the macroeconomic conditions at the time of retirement.  With the exception of
residence, these variables are included only in the age of retirement equation because they should have
been largely unknown to workers at the time pension terms were chosen.  Residence in warm regions is
assumed to affect only the realized retirement age due to the national nature of most pension plans. 
5.    Estimation 
A) Functional Form
Inspection of Table 2 indicates that there are concentrations of retirement at certain ages,
particularly at 62 and 65.  This suggests that linear models may be inappropriate specifications for the
problem under study.  If the "heaping" at certain ages results from factors that are not captured in the
variables used for estimation (such as the structure of the Social Security system), the result will be non-
normality in the error distribution.  An obvious way to rectify this situation is to estimate an ordered     
23For an application, see Moon and Stotsky (1993) and for a general discussion Butler and Chatterjee
(1997).
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categorical model such as an ordered probit or ordered logit model.  In such a model, the threshold values
between the categories can be fitted so as to account for the varying density of retirements at different
ages.  Fields and Mitchell (1984), for example, have estimated an ordered logit model of age of retirement.
Estimation is complicated by the simultaneous nature of the system under study.  There is a limited
literature dealing with bivariate ordered categorical models.  Lee (1982), Uesaka (1986), and Poon et. al.
(1987) provide theoretical bases for such models. The models to date, however, have been simultaneous
only in the sense that they accommodated correlations across the error terms in two ordered categorical
equations or use ordered probit models as the first stage of a selection bias model.
23   None, to our
knowledge, has allowed an endogenous right-hand-side variable in one of the estimated equations.
The likelihood function for such a model is, however, straightforward.  Suppose the two
underlying equations are:




Zt2 = Xt2$2 + ((Xt1$1) + ((,t1 + ,t2)      where ,t2-n(0, F
2
2).
For notational simplicity, the compound error term can be rewritten as:
Rt where Rt-n(0, (
2 F
2
1 + 2(F12 + F
2
2).
The observed categorical variables, Yt1 and Yt2, take on values "j" and "k" according to the rules:
Yt1 = j  ]  :j-1 < Zt1 # :j
and
Yt2 = k  ] <k-1 < Zt2 #<k.
Then, if D is the covariance between ,t1 and Rt, and M2 is the bivariate normal cumulative density function,
the likelihood function becomes:18
where the cell probabilities are defined as:
B) Results
Table 3 contains results of our analysis treating the age of pension eligibility as endogenous and 
including job characteristics among the explanatory variables.  The first two columns present a single-
equation ordered probit estimates where the age of pension eligibility is assumed to be exogenous. 
Consistent with the results from previous studies, a worker's age of pension eligibility appears to play a
highly significant role in determining the age at which that worker will retire.  For example, evaluated at
the sample means, the probability that a worker who is eligible for a pension at age 62 will retire before
age 65 is .70 as opposed to a .30 probability that he will retire at age 65 or above.  Increasing this worker’s
age of eligibility to 65 reduces the probability he will retire before age 65 to .58.
Other variables in the single-equation model generally behave well.  More educated workers retire
later, perhaps reflecting a desire to recoup investments over a longer period or the types of jobs that are
typically held by educated workers.  Government workers are eligible for pensions at an earlier age, but
conditional on the eligibility do not actually retire earlier than other workers.  A similar pattern is seen
with respect to a worker’s permanent income, where higher-income workers opt for earlier pension
eligibility but, conditional on that eligibility, do not retire earlier than other workers.  Workers with health
limitations at the time they retire do retire earlier but are not differentially found in jobs with earlier
pension eligibility, a result consistent with health limitations arising after entering their career job.  The
later a worker starts his career job, the later he is eligible for a pension, reflecting both years of service19
rules common in many pension plans and the fact that workers will be more likely to change employers
late in their working lives if they anticipate retiring at a later age, thereby giving themselves more years to
recoup mobility costs.  This effect seems to be fully captured in pension characteristics and, conditional on
the age of pension eligibility, there is no effect of starting age on actual age of retirement.   Finally,
residents of warm regions retire later, perhaps because those in colder regions have an incentive to retire in
order to be able to move to more pleasant climates.  
Interpretation of the macroeconomic conditions (inflation rates and unemployment rates) used as
an aid in identification, is less straightforward.  They are clearly important in determining actual age of
retirement, with both higher inflation and greater unemployment at the end of a worker’s career leading the
worker to delay retirement.  There are logical reasons why marginal increases in each of these factors
might delay retirement.  To the extent that it is unanticipated, higher inflation reduces the real value of
workers' assets, resulting in an income effect that ought to delay the consumption of greater leisure.  If
workers are expecting to take a post-retirement job (even on a part-time basis), a slack labor market
(reflected in higher unemployment) may make such jobs harder to find, leading workers to remain on their
career jobs longer.  Since we start with a sample of fixed age in 1969, however, if either of these variables
trended upwards over the period for which we follow workers, there will be a degree of spurious
correlation as well.  Unemployment was relatively stable for the first six years of our panel, but did
increase in 1975-76 when a few older workers in the sample were still retiring.  Thus there may be some
upward bias in this measure.  It should be noted, however, that the unemployment rate used in the age of
retirement equation was measured at the two-digit industry level and that most of the variation in
unemployment in our sample is across industries, not over the business cycle.  Inflation rates increased and
decreased several times without any systematic pattern over the period that our panel aged.  Evidence that
these potential biases are not especially important comes from reestimating the equations including
workers who were older than 60 at the start of the survey and who should, therefore, have been subject to
different macroeconomic conditions at each age than the sample used for the main analysis. When this is20
done, the coefficient on unemployment is essentially unchanged while that on inflation is reduced by about
30%.
With respect to unemployment and inflation at the start of the career, there is no apparent effect of
unemployment on age of pension eligibility but some indication that higher inflation rates lead to earlier
provision of pensions.  This is a sensible finding if “monetary illusion” on the part of workers leads them
to interpret higher nominal interest rates associated with higher inflation as an indication of greater ability
to accumulate assets over their working life and, therefore, greater wealth at the time they want to retire.
The pattern of estimated coefficients on the job characteristics measures suggests that they play a
role in the determination of retirement.  In particular, the three characteristics that would seem to be easiest
to observe at the time of hiring are all related to the age at which a worker first becomes eligible for a
pension,  results which generally support the theory that workers' ages of pension eligibility reflects the
impact of job characteristics on their optimally desired retirement ages.  Jobs that involve unpleasant
conditions, greater exposure to hazards, and in which it is difficult to change duties all provide workers
with earlier pensions.  Conditional on their early eligibility for pensions, workers who are in jobs where it
is difficult to change duties actually appear to retire at a later age. Perhaps this finding reflects an overly
pessimistic view of the undesirability of this condition at the time workers enter their career jobs.  The
results regarding job flexibility and control are similar to those reported in Hurd and McGarry (1994),
while those regarding physical conditions are similar to those in Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) and
Holden (1988). 
The final two columns of Table 3 report the results from the simultaneous ordered probit model
where the age of pension eligibility is treated as endogenous.  The key result is that the coefficient on the
age of eligibility reverses sign (to an intuitively meaningless negative sign) and becomes statistically
insignificant.  Thus, it appears that it is important to treat pensions as endogenous in models of retirement
behavior.  This conclusion is further supported by the positive correlation between the error terms in the21
pension eligibility and age of retirement equations (although the t-statistic on this correlation falls shy of
statistical significance).  
Two factors that did not significantly impact age of pension eligibility do appear to be related to
the age at which workers retire.  These are the degree of responsibility for how their work is done (where
more control over the workplace leads to significantly later retirement) and the effort workers expend on
their job (which is negatively related to retirement age although just shy of conventional significance
levels).  We do not know why these factors are related to age of retirement but not to pension eligibility. 
One possibility is that they are more difficult to foresee when negotiating the terms of a pension plan than
the factors we have found to be related to the age of eligibility.  For example, both effort and degree of
responsibility may be related to levels of success on the job (and the level to which a worker rises in an
occupational hierarchy), an outcome that could not be predicted well at the time of initial contract setting. 
Thus, these factors in particular may exhibit a great deal of variation among workers covered by a common
pension plan.   No other results change substantially when the endogeneity of pensions is taken into
account.
C) Identification
We turn now to issues of identification.  The model consists of two interrelated ordered probit
equations.  Both equations are globally convex and the likelihood function for this system is highly
nonlinear.  As is widely established, nonlinear models of this type are globally identified by their
functional form except in certain degenerative cases (see McManus, 1992, for a general proof, and Dansie,
1985, and Bunch and Kitamura, 1991, for a discussion of related models).  Thus, the system we propose to
estimate would be fully identified even if all variables were common to both equations (i.e. the Y and Z
vectors in equations (1) and (2) were empty).
It is, or course, preferable to identify such systems through variables that can be excluded from
each of the equations being estimated on theoretical grounds.  This is not an easy task since the very nature
of the decision process outlined argues that almost everything that is relevant for retirement decisions24Other potential factors influencing desired retirement age, such as health and marital status at the
time of hire, are not available in the RHS.
25Keane (1992) has pointed out for a related model that identification based on functional form may
be tenuous or fragile in the absence of exclusion restrictions.
26Keene suggests that estimates that do not move very far from the starting values provided may be
an indication of fragile identification.  While many estimates from the simultaneous system reported below
are close to the starting values provided from the single equations, this is a function of the quality of the
starting values and not the fragility of the identification.  Reestimating the system with widely different
starting values results in these parameters moving extensively to approximately the values reported using
precise starting values.
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should be related to both the age of eligibility and the observed retirement age.  Perhaps the strongest case
can be made for economy-wide economic conditions.  It is unlikely that an individual, when negotiating
pension terms, can forecast macroeconomic conditions at the time he desires to retire.  Thus, inflation and
unemployment rates at the end of the working life should influence actual retirement decisions but not the
ages of eligibility set decades earlier.  Conversely, especially to the extent that they are taken as predictors
of future conditions, macroeconomic conditions at the time of hire should affect desired retirement ages
(and hence ages of eligibility) but will have been superseded by actual realizations by the time retirement
age itself is determined.
24  
Given the paucity of exclusion restrictions available (as will be seen below, the excluded variables
in the age of eligibility equation are not significant), we also investigated the fragility of the estimates.
25  A
number of findings give us confidence that identification of the current model based largely on functional
form is not a problem.  In particular: (1) the estimated parameters are insensitive to a wide range of starting
values,
26 (2) similar estimates of the parameters are obtained when the model is estimated on randomly27We are grateful to Arthur Lewbel for suggesting this test of the identification of the model.  We
reestimated the model a number of times, each using a different randomly drawn subsample of the data.  In
every case the estimated coefficient from the simultaneous system was lower than that when age of eligibility
was treated as exogenous, and in no case was the estimated coefficient from any one subsample statistically
different from that from any other of the subsamples.
28See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).  Situations where identification is fragile typically require
adjustments such as suggested by Marquadt (1963) to obtain a sensible direction vector.
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chosen subsets of the data,
27 (3) estimated  Hessians are well behaved and far from singular,
28 (4) we
obtained reasonable values of standard errors including a low standard error for the cross equation
correlation of error terms, similar standard errors no matter how derived (from analytic second derivatives
(Newton), the covariance of analytic first derivatives (BHHH), or analytic first and second derivatives
(Eiker-White)) and, in most cases, standard errors that are relatively close to those from the single
equation.
7.    Conclusion
We have examined a world in which both the age of pension eligibility and the age of retirement
are determined by worker and job characteristics that influence productivity and reservation wages.  Both
workers and firms should anticipate an optimal age of retirement at the time of contract negotiation and,
given long-term contract considerations, design a pension plan to induce retirement at this age.  Thus, there
will be a correlation between the age at which a worker retires and the age at which his pension enables
him to receive benefits.  This correlation, however, reflects the fact that both of these ages depend on
common exogenous factors rather than one of them causing the other.
Empirical estimates support this basic framework.  A conventional model where pensions are
assumed to be exogenous suggests that delaying the age of pension eligibility would have a significant
effect in delaying the age at which the worker retires.  Once the endogeneity of eligibility age is taken into
account, however, there is a substantially reduced (and statistically insignificant) role for pensions
themselves as a determinant of retirement.  Indeed, they retain no additional explanatory power beyond
that provided by worker and job characteristics, as well as the macroeconomic environment.  Thus, the24
results support our intuition that truly exogenous alteration of pension characteristics is likely to result in
offsetting changes in private saving rather than major changes in retirement behavior.
These results should be regarded as suggestive.  Information on job characteristics has been added
from sources other than the Retirement History Survey and pertains to a worker’s occupation in general,
not his specific job, with a resulting introduction of measurement errors.  In addition, relatively little is
known about worker characteristics such as health and marital status at the start of career jobs.   Repeated
analysis of the type undertaken here using a richer data set such as the Health and Retirement Survey,
when future waves capture widespread retirement in the sample,  is necessary before weight is placed on
estimated responses to changes in pension systems derived from research that has treated the
characteristics of pension plans as exogenous.25
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Table 1
  Average Age of Retirement of Men in Selected Occupations
Aircraft Mechanics 58.6 Photoengravers 65.0
Explosives Workers 59.2 Painters 65.1
Air Traffic Controllers 59.2 Secretaries 65.2
Actors 59.6 Bailiffs 65.2
Computer Analysts 59.9 Civil Engineers 65.4
Pilots 59.9 Real Estate Agents 65.6
Agricultural Scientists 60.2 Musicians 65.7
Rolling Machine Operators 60.2 Librarians 66.0
Economists 60.3 Stock Brokers 66.2
Police Officers & Detectives 60.3 Barbers 66.5
Computer Operators 60.5 Watch Repairers 66.7
Shoe Machine Operators 60.9 Elevator Operators 66.8
Materials Engineers 61.1 Surveyors 66.9
Sailors and Deckhands 61.2 Farm Workers 67.0
Railroad Conductors 61.2 Parking Lot Attendants 67.3
Telephone Line Installers 61.3 Proofreaders 67.6
Mail Carriers 61.5 Clergy 67.9
Forestry Workers 61.5 Shoe Salespersons 68.0
Concrete Finishers 61.6 Atmospheric Scientists 68.1
Structural Metal Workers 61.7 Motion Picture Projectionists 68.6
Sales Engineers 61.9 Bridge Lighthouse Attendants 69.0
Typists 62.3 Child Care Workers 69.0
Fishers 62.6 Lawyers 69.1
Elementary School Teachers 62.7 Billing Clerks 69.3
Automobile Mechanics 62.8 Physicians 69.3
Machinists 62.9 Paperhangers 69.3
Air Conditioning Mechanics 63.2 Purchasing Agents 69.8
Automobile Salespersons 63.4 Authors 70.6
Pest Control Personnel 63.7 Judges 70.8
Financial Managers 63.8 Crossing Guards 71.031
Carpenters 63.9
Furniture Salespersons 63.9




Household Appliance Repairers 64.9
Source:  Calculated from 1980 Census Public Use Microdata Tapes.  Age of retirement was calculated
from current age and year last worked for all those who were currently over 50, not in the labor force, and
not disabled.         32
Table 2
Distributions of Age of First Pension Eligibility and Age of Retirement
Actual Age of
Retirement
Age First Eligible for Private Pension
<62 62 63-64 65 >65 Total
<62 10 30 0 18 0 58
62 25 59 2 28 2 116
63-64 9 50 7 39 2 107
65 8 58 6 67 2 141
>65 21 31 1 32 3 1
Total 54 210 16 165 8 45333
Table 3
Determinants of Ages of Pension Eligibility and Retirement Including Job Characteristics

































































































































































































Correlation of Error Terms 0.213
(.193)
aIndependent Ordered Probit Estimates.  Age groups equal <62, 62, 63, 64, 65, >65.
bBivariate Ordered Probit Estimates.  Age groups equal <62, 62, 63, 64, 65, >65.
*Statistically significant at the .10 level; **at the .05 level; ***at the .01 level. 35
Appendix Table A-1
Employment Status in 1969
White Males Aged 58-63
STATUS Number Percent
Total 2541 100.0
     Not employed in 1969  365 14.4
     Employed - Job began after age 55  506 19.9
     Employed - Job began before age 55:
          Self-reported retired   18 0.7
          Still on career job in 1969 1652 65.0
100.0
Of those on career job in 1969:
     Hrs/wk always < 30    3 0.2
     Transition to hrs/wk < 30, same employer   53 3.2
     Transition directly to new employer   96 5.8
     No transition observed  247 15.0
     Retired 1969 to 1979 1253 75.8
100.0
Of those observed to retire 1969-1979:
     Covered by employer pension 913 72.9
Of those covered by pension:
     Industry and occupation reported  712
Of those with complete data:
     Ages 58-60 in 1969  453CESifo Working Paper Series 
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